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[351] Aug. 29

Public Papers of the Presidents

Remarks to a Group of Junior Red Cross Representatives From Abroad. August 29, 1962

I AM GLAD to welcome you all to the White House. General, we appreciated your thought about having them come by and see us. I'm glad to see so many here from so many different countries. Maybe we could just get you all identified now. Who's here from Austria? Just hold up your hands. Relgium? Bolivia? Canada? Colombia? Ecuador? Finland? West Germany? Great Britain? Greece? Guatemala? Honduras? India? Indonesia? Iran? Italy? Japan? South Korea? Liberia? Lebanon? Luxem-Mexico? Monaco? >lorocco? Netherlands? New Zealand? Nicaragua? Pakistan? Nigeria? Panama? The Philippines? Poland? Sweden-Svenska? Switzerland? Thailand? Togo? Turkey? United Arab Republic? Yugoslavia? How about the rest of you? Where is Miss Vera Dojcinovic? United States? General, you hold up your hand.

We're glad to have you here, and I must say I think it's most encouraging to have people from so many different countries, including countries where the Government leaders don't always get on, but I think the people do, and I think that it's a very good

reminder to all of us. What hopes we can have for the future and our hopes are in all of you, and also in the very important work that the Red Cross, Red Crescent, and the Red Lion and Sun all do for suffering people everywhere. There are no national boundaries to that issue, and there is only a question of whether we can extend a helping hand

I congratulate all of you for your interest in this cause. It's most worthwhile. Whether you help someone in your own country or in some foreign country the general cause is served. So we're very glad to have you here. I'm sure your families are proud of you, and your countries, and as a great believer in the cause in which you're engaged, I'm very proud of you. So we're happy to have you here.

NOTE: The President spoke at 11 a.m. on the South Lawn at the White House. During his remarks he referred to Vera Dojcinovic of Belgrade, one of the representatives from Yugoslavia.

The group, composed of 112 representatives of the Red Cross. Red Crescent, and Red Lion and Sun Societies from 42 countries, was introduced by Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Chairman of the American National Red Cross.

352 The President's News Conference of August 29, 1962

THE PRESIDENT. Good afternoon. I have-several announcements to make.

[1.] I regret to announce that Associate Justice Frankfurter has retired from regular active service on the Supreme Court. He has served in the Court for 23 years, and for many years before that had an illustrious career as a lawyer and teacher. During his service on the Court, the direction of the law has been channeled by many important decisions which he has rendered. He has always been a vital force in directing those

decisions. Few judges have made as significant and lasting impression upon the law. Few persons have made so important a contribution to our legal traditions and literature. Now regard for his health has compelled him to take a less active part in the Court's labors, and we shall miss him.

To the vacancy created by Justice Frankfurter's retirement, I intend to appoint Secretary Goldberg. Secretary Goldberg will bring to the Court a wealth of experience gained from the active practice of law help of Republican members in the House and Senate, and I'm sure that a good many of them are going to help again, because this is in the vital interests of the United States.

[12.] Q. Mr. President, could we make quite sure of the import of your remarks on inspection against preparation, because in a news conference last February you said that this would be necessary for even a ban on atmosphere tests. Were you saying just now that we do not believe that this kind of inspection against preparation is necessary?

THE PRESIDENT. What I am suggesting is if the test agreement covered only the atmosphere, that there would be under such an agreement possible—quite oviously—a continuation of tests underground and there would be other steps which we could take under those conditions which would keep our preparations, if there was a sudden breach of the kind we had last year, which would keep our preparations in a position to protect our interests.

[13.] Q. Mr. President, was it when you called on Mr. Justice Frankfurter about 2 weeks ago at his home that he informed you of his intention to retire—

THE PRESIDENT. No.

Q.—and could you also shed some light on when you decided to appoint Secretary Goldberg?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes. I received a letter from the Justice. He did not discuss it with me nor did I with him. I received a letter from him yesterday and I wrote him last night, and I will release both of those letters right after this news conference. I decided after I received the Justice's letter that I would appoint Secretary Goldberg, last night, and discussed it with him on that occasion.

[14] Q. Mr. President, Senator Capehart of Indiana in a speech the other day said that the Communists are sending troops into Cuba, not technicians, as you told us last week. Capehart, according to the UPI, also called for United States invasion of Cuba to stop the flow of troops and supplies. Would you comment, sir?

THE PRESIDENT. We've no evidence of troops. And I must say that I know that this matter is of great concern to Americans and many others. The United States has obligations all around the world, including West Berlin and other areas, which are very sensitive, and, therefore, I think that in considering what appropriate action we should take, we have to consider the totality of our obligations, and also the responsibilities which we bear in so many different parts of the world.

In response to your specific question, we do not have information that troops have come into Cuba, number one. Number two, the main thrust, of course, is assistance because of the mismanagement of the Cuban economy which has brought widespread dissatisfaction, economic slowdown, agricultural failures, which have been so typical of the Communist regimes in so many parts of the world. So that I think the situation was critical enough that they needed to be bolstered up.

However, we are continuing to watchwhat happens in Cuba with the closest attention and will respond to—will be glad to announce any new information, if it should come, immediately.

Q. Mr. President, did you answer my question, or Capehart's suggestion that we invade Cuba? What was that answer?

THE PRESIDENT. I'm not for invading Cuba at this time. No, I don't—the words do not have some secondary meaning. I think it would be a mistake to invade Cuba, because I think it would lead to—that it should be very—an action like that, which could be very casually suggested, could lead to very serious consequences for many people.

[15.] Q. Mr. President, the Soviets, as you well know, are continuing to use armored cars to transport their military personnel into West Berlin. Some persons on the scene have expressed the view that unless we object to this, it will give the

Soviets additional rights in West Berlin which they have not had in the past and correspondingly reduce our rights in West Berlin. What could you tell us—

THE PRESIDENT. I don't hold that view at all. I don't agree with that. In my opinion, it doesn't have that effect at all.

[16.] Q. Mr. President, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia has proposed that the 14 nations involved in the Laos conference be reconvened in order to guarantee Cambodia's neutrality. How feasible is such a proposal?

THE PRESIDENT. We are examining his proposal, and we've had conversations with officials of that government. We of course strongly support Cambodia's independence, neutrality, and the sanctity of its borders, and we would of course be glad to take any step which would advance the maintenance of those rights to which Cambodia as a sovereign power is entitled. So we are attempting to consider what step will most usefully advance the objectives which Prince Sihanouk wrote us about

The question of the conference, and whether this would advance it, is a matter which is being considered, but his interests as expressed in the letter are our interests, and in my opinion should be the interests of other free nations.

[17.] Q. Mr. President, I wonder if a distinction could be made with respect to the troops in Cuba. Some of us were told at the State Department the other day that there is Russian military personnel in Cuba, that these are military technicians, and are the people who are probably going to operate missiles, similar to the Nike missiles. Is this in accord—

THE PRESIDENT. I don't know who told you that at the State Department, that they're going to operate Nike missiles, because that information we do not have at this time. There certainly are technicians there. They may be military technicians. We don't have complete information about what's going on in Cuba, but in the sense that troops—the

word "troops" is generally used, they've had a military advisory commission there for a long period of time, so there may be additional military advisory personnel there or technicians. But on the question of troops, as it's generally understood, we do not have evidence that there are Russian troops there. There is an expanded advisory and technical mission.

Q. Are there no antiaircraft missiles shipped into Cuba?

THE PRESIDENT. We have no information as yet. That doesn't mean that there haven't been, but all I'm saying is that we have no such information as yet.

[18.] Q. Mr. President, William C. Foster, head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has said that even if an East-West nuclear test ban treaty with adequate safeguards were negotiated, there's no assurance that it will not be violated. In view of this, and the rising levels of fallout, would there be then much of a risk in signing a treaty to ban all tests in the atmosphere, in the air, outer space, and water, and undertaking then a voluntary moratorium on underground testing?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, there would be a great risk, because we've been through the moratorium route. I would hope we could sign the atmospheric test, which does not require inspection. The underground tests do require inspection to determine if there's been cheating. We went that road before for 3 years, and we found while we were negotiating, the Soviet Union had been preparing for many months to test, so we couldn't accept that again.

[19.] Q. Mr. President, this morning's newspapers carried reports out of Moscow to the effect that traffic from the Soviet Union to Cuba has increased so substantially that they're using ships from NATO countries to deliver some of these goods. Is this a matter you think the United States should take up with the NATO countries?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, definitely, definitely, and I should think that those who are asso-

ciated with us would consider this matter very carefully, and consider what steps they could take to discourage it.

Q. We have up to now not asked our NATO partners?

THE PRESIDENT. We've been in consultation with them about the matter.

[20.] Q. Sir, I wondered if you've had time this last week to figure out some means whereby we might insist that if we give money to the U.N. by bonds, buying bonds or through a contingency fund, that there's some way that we could make them guarantee that the money we give them would not be used in military action against Katanga, and also be used by troops that commit atrocities.

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I thought we went over this road last week, but I'm glad to go over it again.

Q. You said that you had not immediately agreed with the part about atrocities, and I thought maybe this last week you might have had time to reconsider.

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I have thought about it, and I would say that I'd just like-I know the interest some have in Katanga, which I have always found to be interesting, but I will say that the situation in the Congo is very critical. And it's not only the matter of the Congo, of Kantanga, but also the situation in the rest of the Congo, which has no funds except those that have been supplied by the United Nations and by the United States, in very limited amounts of trade, and if we are unsuccessful or if the Congolese are unsuccessful-in bringing about a union on a satisfactory basis between the Katanga and the Congo—the remaining of the Congo—you are liable to find a very critical situation in the rest of the Congo, which would be very dangerous to the free world. So I would hope that those who have enlisted on one side or another would consider the general interest of a united Congo in a peaceful non-Communist Africa, which I believe very much at issue.

Now, in regard to the U.N. bonds, I strongly support it and I think that the cause of the United States as well as the free world would be advanced if the bonds were passed and the United Nations kept going. I don't want to see the United Nations go bankrupt and all of its peacekeeping machinery go into the ash can.

[21.] Q. Sir, would you tell us what the Monroe Doctrine means to you today in the light of world conditions and in Cuba?

THE PRESIDENT. The Monroe Doctrine means what it has meant since President Monroe and John Quincy Adams enunciated it, and that is that we would oppose a foreign power extending its power to the Western Hemisphere. And that's why we oppose what is being—what's happening in Cuba today. That's why we have cut off our trade. That's why we worked in the OAS and in other ways to isolate the Communist menace in Cuba. That's why we'll continue to give a good deal of our effort and attention to it.

[22.] Q. Mr. President, on the question of nuclear tests, can you explain how the security of the United States can be adequately protected by an agreement on our part 4 months hence to sign a test treaty, ban treaty, while the Soviet Union is in the middle of an extensive series of tests? Does this mean that you have determined that in this series they cannot catch up or overtake us?

they could make sufficient progress in this series of tests to adversely affect our security, number one; and number two, if we do not get an agreement, and I would say the chances are not—I'm not sanguine about the chances of an agreement—if we do not get an agreement, the danger to the United States will be greatly increased as more and more countries develop an atomic capacity and present us with an increasing danger as the decade goes on. So in answer to your question, I believe that the quicker we can get a test agreement the better off we will be-